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Abstract 
At the Battle of San Jacinto, General Sam Houston said "Remember the 
Alamo!" The question however is how should we remember it? Do we 
remember it as the American icon of freedom and liberty that has forever 
idolized figures such as Davy Crockett, James Bowie, and William Barret 
Travis? Before this question can be answered, one must first have a more 
precise understanding of what occurred at the Alamo. This can only be 
gained by looking at the battle from not only the side of the Texan rebels, 
but the Mexican troops as well. Little focus has been given to the 
experience of the Mexicans who were present at the siege. This raises the 
question of how does the story of what occurred at the Alamo differ when 
seen through the point of view of these participants. The historical trend 
has been to focus on the events of the siege of the Alamo through the 
experiences of its defenders. It is by focusing on the events of the Battle of 
the Alamo through the experience of the Mexican troops in addition to the 
experiences of the Texan rebels, that we can be able to gain a better 
understanding of not only the battle itself, but also be able to see why the 
Mexicans viewed the Battle of the Alamo as a Pyrrhic victory. Also, by 
answering this question, insight can be gained into how the outcome of the 
Battle of the Alamo affected Santa Anna and his troops throughout the rest 
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of the Texas campaign, because it was the "loss" that the troops felt they 
suffered that brought down their morale and affected their motivation to 
fight later on in the Texan campaign, thus leading to their loss at San 
Jacinto. Hence, by examining the Mexican primary sources concerned with 
the Battle of the Alamo I propose that there was no real victory for the 
Mexican armies, and that the call for battle in the "Remember the Alamo!" 
that Houston initiated was a straw man effectively manipulated for many 
years.  
At the Battle of San Jacinto, General Sam Houston said “Remember the 
Alamo!” 1 The question however, is how should we remember it? Do we 
remember it as the American icon of freedom and liberty that has forever 
idolized figures such as Davy Crockett, James Bowie, and William Barret 
Travis? Before this question can be answered, one must first have an accurate 
understanding of what occurred at the Alamo. This can only be gained by 
looking at the battle from not only the side of the Texan rebels, but the Mexican 
troops as well. Little focus has been given to the experience of the Mexicans 
who were present at the siege. This raises the question of how does the story 
of what occurred at the Alamo differ when seen through the point of view of 
these participants. The historical trend has been to focus on the events of the 
siege of the Alamo through the experiences of its defenders. It is time that 
these issues which shed light on the experiences of the Mexicans under the 
command of Santa Anna, including their struggles, and the disagreements 
which occurred among Santa Anna's senior officers, are given the appropriate 
historical attention. It is by focusing on the events of the Battle of the Alamo 
through the experience of the Mexican troops, in addition to the experiences of 
the Texan rebels, that we can be able to gain a better understanding of not only 
the battle itself, but also be able to see why the Mexicans viewed the Battle of 
the Alamo as a Pyrrhic victory 2 . It is important to address the issues which 
have not been addressed by other historians. This is important not simply to 
retell the story of the Alamo from a different point of view, but to look at what 
occurred through the perspective of the Mexicans and by doing so, be able to 
seek answers to the question of why did the Mexicans see the Battle of the 
Alamo as a loss, or a Pyrrhic victory. By answering this question the issues 
surrounding the Battle of the Alamo that other historians have not given the 
appropriate attention can be addressed. Also, by answering this question, 
insight can be gained into how the outcome of the Battle of the Alamo affected 
Santa Anna and his troops throughout the rest of the Texas campaign, because 
it was the “loss” that the troops felt they suffered that brought down their 
morale, and affected their motivation to fight later on in the Texan campaign, 
thus leading to their loss at San Jacinto. 
The Battle of the Alamo took place from February 23 to March 6, 1836. The 
Alamo served as a fort which blocked one of two entrances into Texas from 
Mexico, and was also a way to alert the Texan settlements of enemy attack. 
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James Clinton Neill was placed in command of the Alamo, and was 
considered to be the logical choice because of his artillery experience and his 
regular army commission. 3 The main problem at the Alamo was its lack of 
supplies and it was this, coupled with the lack of reinforcements which would 
eventually cause the Alamo to fall to Santa Anna. Evidence of this lack of 
supplies can be seen in a letter Neill wrote to General Sam Houston in which 
he stated: “Unless we are reinforced and victualled, we must become an easy 
prey to the enemy, in case of attack.” 4 It was soon after this that Houston 
ordered that the Alamo be abandoned and on January 19, sent James Bowie to 
carry out this order. Upon his arrival at the Alamo, Bowie was impressed by 
how those who were there worked to turn the Alamo into a fort, and it was then 
that he stated that he would rather “die in these ditches” 5 before he would give 
up the post. 
On February 3, Texas governor Henry Smith sent William Barret Travis and 
his troops to the Alamo and five days later on February 8, David Crockett 
arrived with volunteers from the United States. When Neill left on furlough on 
February 14, he placed Travis in charge as post commander, but this caused 
resentment among the volunteer troops who wanted Bowie to be placed in 
charge. As a result, a compromise was reached in which Travis would 
command the regular armymen and Bowie the volunteers. Also, both men 
would sign all orders and correspondence until Neill returned. 6  
Those who were at the Alamo underestimated Santa Anna and felt that the 
Mexican troops would be unable to reach the Alamo until March 15, and as a 
result they were caught off guard when Santa Anna and his troops arrived on 
February 23. Santa Anna demanded that the Alamo surrender, but instead of 
conceding to this, Travis responded by firing a cannonball at Santa Anna's 
troops. The next day Travis took full command of the Alamo because Bowie 
became ill and was bedridden. Upon taking command, Travis swore “Victory or 
death” 7 and promised that he would “never surrender or retreat.” 8  
On March 5 Santa Anna announced to his troops that they would attack the 
following day. For his troops this was a surprise because the surrender of the 
Alamo seemed to be imminent due to its crumbling walls and lack of supplies. 
While some of his troops objected to the plan, Santa Anna ignored them, and 
during the early hours of March 6, Santa Anna attacked from four directions. 
During the attack, Travis was one of the first to die. Those in the Alamo soon 
retreated to the officers' quarters where they engaged the Mexicans in hand to 
hand combat. It was here where Bowie died. The chapel was the last part of the 
Alamo to fall and those defenders, who survived, were executed in accordance 
with Santa Anna's orders. 9 In total, all 189 defenders died at the Alamo, and of 
the approximate 6,000 Mexican troops, about 600 were wounded or died in the 
siege. 10  
History teaches us that when we look to the past, we must look at it from all 
possible points of view in order to understand the entire story that the past is 
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trying to tell. Most accounts of the Alamo tell the story from the Texan point 
of view and more often than not, the Mexican side of the story is barely touched 
upon. This has resulted in the mythologization of the Battle of the Alamo that 
exists today which includes Davy Crockett bravely dying in battle fighting the 
Mexicans and William Barret Travis drawing the line in the sand for his troops 
to cross if they chose to remain with him to defend the Alamo. It is the 
mythologization of the Battle of the Alamo which has greatly contributed to what 
the Alamo has come to symbolize for many people today. The Battle of the 
Alamo has come to symbolize American freedom and liberty and “Remember 
the Alamo” has become not only a national slogan, but a pop culture 
phenomenon 11 . The problem with this is that when the time comes to 
remember the Alamo, what people remember is incorrect. People remember 
only that which has been turned into a media circus by the presentation of the 
Alamo story by companies and actors such as Walt Disney and John Wayne. 
Richard R. Flores discusses this in his article Memory-Place, Meaning, and the 
Alamo. In this article he discusses what he remembers learning about the 
Alamo as a child; that the Alamo was “the site where legends fell in martyrdom 
for my freedom. Bowie. Travis. Crockett. Texan heroes all of them.” 12  
These presentations do little to offer accurate contributions to what actually 
occurred at the Alamo, and only serve to help feed the myths that already exist. 
These myths only help to shroud the truth of what occurred at the Alamo in a 
cloak of mystery, and the truth needs to be uncovered. The importance of this 
is not merely to satisfy our curiosity of what occurred in the past, but to have a 
better knowledge of what occurred and to gain insight into how what took place 
laid the groundwork for what happened later on, as well as to see the impact it 
has had on society today. The only way to uncover the truth of the Battle of the 
Alamo is by looking at the battle from not only the perspective of the Texans, 
but the Mexicans as well. It is by looking at the Battle of the Alamo through the 
eyes of the Mexicans who were there that we can come to learn how they felt 
about what occurred and why they viewed the Alamo as a Pyrrhic victory. 
Few historians have taken the viewpoint of the Battle of the Alamo as a 
Pyrrhic victory. While the Mexicans won the Battle, the troops under Santa 
Anna felt that the battle was a loss for them due to the number of lives lost, and 
the fact that the losses they suffered could have been avoided. Most of what 
has been said about the Battle of the Alamo has been written so that it tells the 
story as it occurred from the Texan side. Little of what has been written 
discusses in detail the battle from the Mexican point of view. The way most 
historians have written about the Battle of the Alamo is that it was a loss for the 
Texans and a victory for the Mexicans. One example which presents this view 
is Battle of the Alamo, a documentary that was made for the Discovery 
Channel. This documentary tries to offer a balanced account of what occurred. 
It makes use of several sources for the Texan side; however its main source for 
the portrayal of the Mexican side of the Battle is the diary by José Enrique de la 
Peña 13 . Although the de la Peña diary is a valuable source, other sources 
need to be consulted in order to get a better idea as to what the Mexican side 
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of the battle was really like. While the documentary also makes note of the 
fact that there was confusion within the Mexican camp, it does not however, go 
on to point out how that confusion affected the troops and would ultimately be 
one of the factors that would be responsible for causing the losses the Mexican 
troops suffered. 
In his book The Texas Revolutionary Experience: A Political and Social 
History, 1835-1836, Paul D. Lack makes the argument that the events of the 
Battle of the Alamo and the Texas campaign have been mythologized 14 . Lack 
also talks about the efforts of the Texan campaign as being “wracked by 
internal conflict, racial bias, personal ambition, and a nearly overwhelming 
individualism that plagued this revolution from its 1835 beginnings through the 
autumn of 1836.” 15 Although he mentions all of these issues, he discusses 
them from only the Texan side. While this book has addressed the problems 
that the Texans experienced, Lack reached the conclusion that the Texan 
campaign was not really a revolution, and also fails to discuss in depth the 
views of the Mexicans about the Battle and the issues which were problems for 
the Mexican troops. 
In his book Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution, 1835-
1836, Stephen Hardin offers a well analyzed account of the strategies of both 
the Texans and the Mexicans, as well as a well balanced account of what 
happened at the Alamo. Although his work is a well documented history of what 
happened at the Battle of the Alamo, like the other works mentioned, it fails to 
truly address the problems of the Mexican troops and why the soldiers under 
Santa Anna's command came to view the battle as not a victory but a loss.  
José Enrique de la Peña was a captain who received a field commission as 
a lieutenant colonel at the start of the Texas campaign. De la Peña has been 
considered by historians to be an angry person. Much of this anger was 
directed towards the Mexican political and military establishment rather than the 
Texan rebels. 16 While one would think that because of this he was opposed to 
the campaign against the rebels, he in fact believed the campaign was 
necessary “in order to prevent not only dismemberment but also dishonor for 
the Mexican nation.” 17 The diary which he kept throughout the Mexican 
campaign in Texas provides a firsthand insight into what the experience of the 
Mexican troops was like during the siege. While the de la Peña diary is a key 
source of information, it is also the source of information about the Alamo that 
has been considered to be the most controversial, and as a result, there have 
been various debates on the authenticity of the document itself as well as the 
credibility of what the diary itself says. 
In his diary, de la Peña offers an explanation in his prologue as to why he 
wrote the diary and published it. In the prologue to his diary, de la Peña states: 
The diversity of opinions expressed 
concerning the Texas campaign; the 
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accumulation of lies told to falsify the events, 
published in national as well as international 
newspapers, but especially in the latter, and 
the cheap adulation have rendered to the 
men least deserving of it; the ignorance, 
stupidity, and cruelty displayed by the 
ministry and the commander in chief of this 
war; the honor of the army, unjustly censured 
even by its own members, who without 
adequate knowledge have superficially or 
inaccurately passed judgement; the honor 
and self-esteem of every military man who 
participated, so deeply hurt by the 
inaccuracies in the official records as to 
dates, deeds, and places; and above all the 
honor of the country, deeply compromised by 
its leaders and no less by the truth and the 
atrocity of its crimes – these are the principal 
causes which compelled me to publish the 
diary I kept during the time I served in this 
unfortunate campaign. 18  
The explanation which de la Peña gives is that he is trying to set the record 
straight about what happened during the Mexican campaign in Texas. By 
writing his diary he hoped to return honor to the men in the military as well the 
honor of Mexico and its people. De la Peña had no ulterior motives to 
publishing his diary. He would receive no monetary gain from it, would garner 
no public status from it, and more likely than not he would have made enemies 
for himself by publishing his diary. De la Peña mentioned this in the prologue to 
his diary as well. 
I have heard some military personnel, 
especially those with rank say that whatever 
happened in Texas should remain buried in 
the deepest silence because it is shameful;…
Others who have heard about my diary, have 
been cruel enough to say that for writing it 
alone, I should be condemned to isolation in 
a fortress, and when they see that I have 
published it, they will no doubt think that I 
should be shot. 19  
It is by stating these facts, that de la Peña gives proof that there is no 
reason for him to lie in what he writes within the pages of his diary, thus giving 
support to the document's credibility as fact. 
In his book, Sleuthing the Alamo: Davy Crockett's Last Stand and Other 
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Myths of the Texas Revolution, James E. Crisp gives evidence which 
supports the authenticity of the de la Peña diary. In the chapter on the diary 
itself, Crisp discusses Bill Groneman's book Defense of a Legend: Crockett and 
the de la Peña Diary. Groneman's book challenged not only the accuracy of the 
de la Peña diary but its authenticity as well, arguing that the diary was a 
forgery. 20 According to Crisp, Groneman's book claimed that “the de la Peña 
manuscript contained telltale anachronisms indicating a forgery”. 21 Crisp 
however, goes on to tell how after reading Groneman's book and researching 
the claims Groneman made, that he was able to dispel these claims and give 
proof that the diary was accurate and authentic. 
It is in the fourth chapter of his diary that de la Peña relates the events of 
the Battle of the Alamo. Along with explaining what occurred during the battle, 
de la Peña also offers his own opinions about what happened and why what 
happened occurred the way it did. It is through the opinions and beliefs that de 
la Peña expressed, that we can gain a better perspective of the Battle of the 
Alamo from the point of view of the Mexican troops. In his diary, de la Peña 
discusses the events of February 23 when Santa Anna's troops came upon the 
Alamo. He also discusses how Santa Anna refused to enter into any 
agreements with the rebels and required their unconditional surrender, 
something that the rebels would be unwilling to agree to. Little else is discussed 
about the events of the siege between February 23 and March 5. The primary 
focus of de la Peña's writings in this section of his diary is what occurred behind 
the scenes during the siege within the Mexican camp.  
Most of the Mexicans involved in the battle were more than willing to serve 
under Santa Anna in his Texas campaign. To these soldiers, it was an honor to 
defend their country and they were of the belief that their cause was a just one. 
Much of this belief was spurred by speeches given by Santa Anna and the 
effect of what was said was clearly evident among the troops: 
‘Soldiers, our comrades have been 
shamefully sacrificed at Anáhuac, Goliad, 
and Béjar, and you are those destined to 
punish these murderers. My friends: we will 
march as long as the interests of the nation 
that we serve demand'...This address was 
received enthusiastically, but the army 
needed no enticement; knowing that it was 
about to engage in the defense of the country 
and to avenge less fortunate comrades was 
enough for its ardor to become as great as 
the noble and just cause it was about to 
defend. 22  
Many of the troops however, also felt that because the Alamo was only 
occupied by a small number of people, that there would be no need to have a 
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great loss of life, especially since the Alamo held no political or military 
importance for Mexico. It is here in his diary that de la Peña suggests that had it 
not been for the fall of the Alamo, the Mexican troops would have been able to 
surprise and defeat General Houston. 23 If the events of the siege had occurred 
differently, and Santa Anna had in fact left only a small force to keep watch 
over the Alamo, he most likely would have defeated Houston at San Jacinto, 
because it was the fall of the Alamo that served as the rallying force that drove 
the Texan rebels to defeat Santa Anna there.  
Disagreements arose over some issues among Santa Anna's officers. Often 
times these disagreements were with the orders that Santa Anna himself had 
given. Two examples of this are the council of war that took place on March 4, 
and the discussion of what would be done with any prisoners of war. While 
these disagreements were present and served to show the weakness of the 
officers as a united group, they were never made known to Santa Anna 
because the officers knew that their commander “would not tolerate opposition, 
his sole pleasure being in hearing what met with his wishes, while discarding all 
admonitions that deviated from those wishes,” 24 It was during the council of war 
that Santa Anna made the argument about the necessity of making an assault 
on the Alamo. It was also this issue which the officers disagreed upon: 
During a council of war held on the 4 th of 
March at the commander in chief's quarters, 
he expounded on the necessity of making the 
assault. Generals Sesma, Cos, and 
Castrillón, Colonels Almonte, Duque, Amat, 
Romero, and Salas, and the interim mayor of 
San Luis were present and gave their 
consent...Some, though approving this 
proposal in the presence of the commander 
in chief, disagreed in his absence. 25  
There were several officers who shared the sentiments of the attack being 
unnecessary since the surrender of the Alamo was almost imminent due to the 
fact that the Texans were lacking in supplies. One officer, who like de la Peña 
disagreed with the necessity of the attack, was Captain José Juan Sánchez 
Navarro y Estrada. He discusses this in his journal when he states: “It is said 
that His Excellency favors an assault, while everyone feels the opposite…Why 
is it Sr. Santa Anna always wants his triumphs and defeats to be marked by 
blood and tears!” 26  
The second issue which the officers disagreed upon was what should be 
done with prisoners of war. While some felt that any prisoners should be 
executed, others felt this action to be too extreme, but this argument proved to 
have no effect, and in the end all prisoners were executed in accordance with 
Santa Anna's wishes:  
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The subject of what to do with prisoners was 
brought up, in case the enemy surrendered 
before the assault, the example of Arredondo 
was cited; during the Spanish rule he had 
hanged eight hundred or more colonists after 
having triumphed in a military action, and this 
conduct was taken as a model. General 
Castrillón and Colonel Almonte then voiced 
principles regarding the rights of men, 
philosophical and humane principles which 
did them honor; they reiterated these later 
when General Urrea's prisoners were 
ordered executed, but their arguments were 
fruitless. 27  
A reason for Santa Anna being so willing to adopt the methods used by 
Arredondo as a model is that Santa Anna served under Arredondo when he 
was still a young officer and was greatly impressed by the methods Arredondo 
employed. De la Peña, however was not like his commander in chief and felt 
that to use such methods against the enemy would not only be unnecessary, 
but counterproductive as well. 28  
The main reason for the assault on the Alamo in 1836 was General Cos' 
defeat at San Antonio in December 1835. This defeat resulted in a large loss of 
life, and caused the Mexican army much anguish. De la Peña suggests that it is 
because of this that Santa Anna pursued the assault on the Alamo because for 
him “To retake San Antonio, the historical capital of Texas, was an essential 
step in erasing the stain left by Cos' defeat.” 29 A second reason for Santa 
Anna's decision to attack the Alamo may have been a statement made by 
Travis to his troops in the Alamo that if they did not receive food, munitions, and 
reinforcements by March 5, that they would either surrender or attempt to 
escape during the night. If this is true, then this would have spurred Santa Anna 
to move forward with an assault because it was thought by some that “he 
wanted to cause a sensation and would have regretted taking the Alamo 
without clamor and without bloodshed.” 30  
The military strategy that Santa Anna put into place for the attack on March 
6 is of great importance. It was this strategy which was a major factor in the 
Battle turning out the way in which it did. Santa Anna issued the order for the 
attack on March 5. He issued the order to the generals, chiefs of sections, and 
the commanding officers. It was in the attack order that Santa Anna gave 
general instructions to his officers about the plan for the attack.  
The time has come to strike a decisive blow 
upon the enemy occupying the Fortress of 
the Alamo. Consequently, His Excellency, 
the General-in-chief, has directed that, 
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tomorrow, at 4 o'clock A.M., the columns of 
attack shall be stationed at musket-shot 
distance from the first entrenchments, ready 
for the charge, which shall commence at a 
signal to be given with the bugle, from the 
Northern Battery…The troops composing the 
columns of attack will turn in to sleep at dark, 
to be in readiness to move at 12 o'clock at 
night…As soon as the moon raises, the 
centre companies of the Active Battalion of 
San Luis will abandon the points they are 
now occupying on the line, in order to have 
time to prepare. 31  
Santa Anna made the decision to use four columns of troops for the attack. 
General Cos, Colonel Duque, Colonel Romero, and Colonel Morales each were 
placed in charge of one of the four columns. Santa Anna chose to command 
the Sapper Battalion that would be part of the reserve himself, but left the 
responsibility of the Battalion's formation up to Colonel Amat. The way in which 
each column attacked and the men who made up each of the columns were 
also key elements to the success of Santa Anna's strategy. When the assault 
on the Alamo began on March 6, all the columns were able to reach the walls of 
the Alamo except for the third. The third column was held back by cannonfire 
and forced to find another entrance. It was then, upon seeing the difficulties that 
the third column was having, that Santa Anna gave the order for Colonel Amat 
to move in with the reserves. It was also at this time that Santa Anna also 
ordered into battle his general staff and everyone who was at his side. 32  
Figure 1: Floor plan of the Alamo with indications to how Santa Anna's 
troops attacked.66  
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Four columns were chosen for the attack. 
The first, under command of General Cos 
and made up of a battalion from Aldama and 
three companies from the San Luis 
contingent, was to move against the western 
front which faced the city. The second, under 
Colonel Duque and made up of the battalion 
under his command and three other 
companies from San Luis was entrusted with 
a like mission against the front facing the 
north...These two columns had a total 
strength of seven hundred men. The third, 
under command of Colonel Romero and 
made up of two companies of fusiliers from 
Matamoros and Jiménez battalions, had less 
strength, for it only came up to three hundred 
or more men; it was to attack the east 
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front...The fourth column, under command of 
Colonel Morales and made up of over a 
hundred chasseurs, was entrusted with 
taking the entrance to the fort and the 
entrenchments defending it. The Sapper 
Battalion and five grenadier companies made 
up the reserve of four hundred men. 33  
The end of the battle was where the most life was lost and the most blood 
was shed for both the Mexicans and the Texan rebels. As the Mexican soldiers 
would enter into rooms where it appeared that the rebels were surrendering, 
the soldiers would be attacked, and as a result of this the anger of the Mexican 
troops towards the men defending the Alamo was renewed. The order was 
given that no one other than women were to be spared, and it is de la Peña's 
belief that had this order not been given, much of the Mexican blood which was 
spilled could have been spared. 34 The attack finally came to an end at 
approximately six o'clock in the morning, and lasted no longer than ninety 
minutes. It was only after seeing the devastation among his own troops that 
Santa Anna addressed them, giving them praise for their courage and thanked 
them on behalf of their country. 35  
The death of Davy Crockett, and what de la Peña says about it has led to 
much controversy over the course of time. While some argue that Crockett died 
fighting during the battle, what de la Peña states in his diary goes to suggest 
that Crockett did not die fighting, but that he in fact surrendered along with six 
other survivors and was executed by Santa Anna after the battle had already 
ended. 36 Santa Anna's order to execute Crockett caused outrage among his 
officers and they did not support this order. Nonetheless, Crockett was 
executed when  
Several officers who were around the 
president and who, perhaps, had not been 
present during the moment of danger, 
became noteworthy by an infamous deed, 
surpassing the soldiers in cruelty. They thrust 
themselves forward, in order to flatter their 
commander, and with swords in hand, fell 
upon these unfortunate, defenseless men 
just as a tiger leaps upon his prey. Though 
tortured before they were killed, these 
unfortunates died without complaining and 
without humiliating themselves before their 
torturers. 37  
While de la Peña was present at the time of the execution, he turned away 
when it occurred because he did not want “to witness such a barbarous scene.” 
38  
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Many of the Mexican soldiers who fell at the Alamo were buried by their 
brothers-in-arms, and days after the assault, many questions still remained 
among the survivors including who was to blame for the loss of life that Mexico 
had suffered. One suggestion of whom the blame for the deaths of the Mexican 
soldiers would fall upon is General Ramírez y Sesma. The reasoning for this 
being that General Ramírez y Sesma was advised to enter the town of Béjar at 
a time when there were only ten men inside the Alamo, and he had failed to do 
so. Had he done as he was advised, those who were still in Béjar would have 
been unable to seek refuge in the Alamo, “thus avoiding the painful catastrophe 
we witnessed.” 39 There were also many other major questions which were left 
unanswered after the attack. Included in these questions were:  
It was questioned why a breach had not been 
opened? What had been the use of bringing 
up the artillery if it were not to be used when 
necessity required,...Why, before agreeing 
on the sacrifice, which was great indeed, had 
no one borne in mind that we had no means 
at our disposal to save our wounded? Why 
were our lives so uselessly sacrificed in a 
deserted and totally hostile country if our 
losses could not be replaced? 40  
The blame for agreeing to go forth with the attack when there were no 
means present to save those who were wounded rests solely on the shoulders 
of Santa Anna himself. This blame lies with Santa Anna because it was during 
the council of war when the officers and the interim mayor of San Luis gave 
their consent to go ahead with the assault, no mention was ever made to them 
about the fact that there would be no field hospitals or surgeons for the 
wounded, meaning that for some, it would have been easier for them to die 
than be wounded. 41 Had the officers and the mayor of San Luis been made 
aware of this information, it can only be assumed that they would not have 
given their consent to go ahead with the attack on the Alamo.  
De la Peña's belief that the reason for the number of Mexican lives lost had 
to do with Santa Anna's order to spare no one but the women reflects the 
sentiments of many of the soldiers who survived the siege. For many of the 
troops, although they had been victorious in battle, the Battle of the Alamo was 
not considered a victory. In the minds of these soldiers the amount of life lost 
on the side of the Mexicans was great and unnecessary. This was also what 
influenced Santa Anna to alter the numbers of Mexican soldiers as well as the 
Texan rebels who were killed in his reports.  
According to documents found among these 
men and to subsequent information, the force 
within the Alamo consisted of 182 men; but 
according to the number by us it was 253. 
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Doubtless the total did not exceed either of 
these two, and in any case the number is 
less than referred to by the commander in 
chief in his communiqúe, which contends that 
in the excavations and the trenches alone, 
more than 600 bodies had been buried. What 
was the object of this misrepresentation? 
Some believe it was to give greater 
importance to the episode, others that it was 
done to excuse our losses and to make it 
less painful. 42  
It was clear that for the surviving troops, the loss of their comrades was 
difficult, and the circumstances surrounding this massive loss, made it an 
inexcusable one. However, while the losses suffered by the Mexicans may 
have been inexcusable and avoidable had other actions been taken against the 
Texans, once Santa Anna put his strategy into play, the losses he suffered 
were inevitable due to the problems the Mexican troops were faced with.  
There were various problems that Santa Anna and his troops encountered 
throughout the battle. While any one of these problems on their own may not 
have had much effect on the troops or the losses that they suffered, when put 
together, the only foreseeable outcome was what actually occurred. It was what 
actually occurred that resulted in the greatest problem of all for the Mexican 
camp: the loss of life they suffered. The first problem which the troops had was 
figuring out the method in which to carry out the plan that Santa Anna had for 
attacking the Alamo. The troops lacked weapons and even though the field 
pieces and artillery would not arrive for another day or so, the order for the 
attack was still given on the 5 th of March. 43 To compensate for the lack of 
available weaponry, “the columns had been ordered to provide themselves with 
crow-bars, hatchets, and ladders.” 44 This order did not serve to help the troops 
however, because “not until the last moment did it become obvious that all this 
was insufficient and that the ladders were poorly put together.” 45 The losses 
suffered by the Mexicans also hindered their own success because “The few 
poor ladders that we were bringing had not arrived, because their bearers had 
either perished on the way or had escaped. Only one was seen of all those that 
were planned.” 46 Had the troops had enough of the necessary weapons, they 
would have been better prepared to defend themselves, and would possibly 
been able to minimize the losses they suffered.  
A second problem for the Mexican troops was that they had no officers from 
the engineers' corps present at the siege. These officers had remained in 
Mexico, and without them Santa Anna had to rely on the personnel from the 
Sapper Battalion to estimate the strength and defenses of the Alamo. This 
alone however, was not a great problem since those in the Sapper Battalion 
who were charged with carrying out this task were capable of doing so with 
some degree of accuracy. It was when this lack of the appropriate personnel 
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became coupled with the lack of communication that there was a larger 
problem at hand.  
To whom was this sacrifice useful…It was 
paid for dearly, though it could have been 
otherwise had these men been required to…
communicate to their comrades the fate that 
awaited them if they did not desist from their 
unjust cause. They could have informed their 
comrades of the force and resources that the 
enemy had. 47  
This lack of communication between the troops contributed to the losses 
that Santa Anna suffered moreso than the lack of the officers from the 
engineers' corp. Because the appropriate personnel was not available to give 
the most accurate estimate of the strength and defenses of the Alamo, the 
communication among the troops was of paramount importance to ensure that 
the attack went as planned and to minimize the amount of life lost. It was 
because this communication was not there, that the troops suffered the losses 
they did.  
The level of the preparedness of the Mexican troops was a larger problem 
than just their weapons. The ladders themselves were a significant issue 
because with the plan of sending twenty eight ladders into the siege and so 
many soldiers to use them, it raises questions about how effective this type of 
attack would be. 48 Also, Santa Anna gives an insight into what the level of 
training was for many of his troops by specifying in his military order from 
March 5 that the soldiers would need to use chin straps on their hats and that 
the soldiers should be wearing shoes or sandals. 49 By saying this in his military 
order, he gives an insight into the low level of training that his troops had 
received. Had his soldiers received higher levels of training, it would have been 
unnecessary for Santa Anna to specify an order for something his soldiers 
should have already known to do. Beyond the training of the soldiers 
themselves, Santa Anna's troops were also under prepared in the amount of 
food that they brought with them for the campaign. In a letter that he had written 
to General Filisola on February 27, Santa Anna writes: “Your Excellency will 
command the Purveyor General to gather all of the food supplies and to march 
immediately, avoiding any delays that might hamper the services of the Nation, 
as these troops are lacking in food.” 50 The shortage of food is an important 
factor for the Mexican camp because it was on February 27, four days after 
arriving in San Antonio and still several days before the actual attack, that 
Santa Anna addresses this issue. Without food, it would be difficult for the 
troops to regain their strength after the march into San Antonio in order to be 
ready for battle. Another problem with this was that there was also a shortage 
of funds. In the same letter to General Filisola, Santa Anna stated 
“Your Excellency will also order that the Treasury, with the Commissary, 
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take the lead with forced marches, and escorted by a convoy, as there is a 
very urgent need for money.” 51 This is important, because had there been 
enough funds for his troops, Santa Anna would have been able to purchase not 
only the food that his soldiers needed, but weapons as well.  
Besides not being prepared for such a campaign because of a lack of 
weapons, food, and money, the troops also did not have the appropriate 
medical staff necessary to care for those who would be wounded in battle. This 
was cause for much upset among the troops after the battle. Carlos Castañeda 
was a soldier who published an account of the Texas campaign in 1837. He 
discusses the results of the lack of proper medical staff and facilities in his 
account.  
Three hundred were left dead in the field and 
more than a hundred of the wounded died 
afterwards as a result of the lack of proper 
medical attention and medical facilities in 
spite of the fact that their injuries were not 
serious. 52  
This lack of facilities for those who would need medical attention is one of 
the largest contributing factors to the number of Mexican troops that died. To 
the troops, those who died were not considered the only victims of the attack. 
Some survivors would come to view those who were killed as lucky when 
compared to those who were only wounded. In his journal, Captain José Juan 
Sánchez Navarro y Estrada talks about the wounded as though they were in a 
worse state than those who were killed in battle.  
There are no hospitals, medicines, or 
doctors; and the condition of the wounded is 
such as to cause pity. They have no 
mattresses on which to lie or blankets with 
which to cover themselves, in spite of the fact 
that on entering Béxar, we took from the 
enemy the remnants of three or four stores 
and that one has been set up and called the 
Government Store, where everything is sold 
at a high price and for cash. 53  
It was conditions such as these which would contribute to the mindset of the 
Mexican troops about the outcome of the Battle of the Alamo as more of a loss 
than a victory, as well as a shameful event in their nation's history. 
The way the Mexican troops themselves felt about the attack on the Alamo 
and its aftermath have not been given much attention by historians. Many of the 
troops after the battle felt that the attack on the Alamo, although it was a 
victory, was not worth the lives that were lost in the process. In his account of 
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what happened at the Alamo, Carlos Castañeda refers to it as a massacre.  
One hundred and eight-three unfortunate 
wretches who were sacrificed there cost us 
the lives of over 400 Mexicans! He would 
have us believe that ‘life was guaranteed to 
the enemy on the condition that they 
surrender their arms and take an oath never 
to take them up again against Mexico.’ There 
never was such a promise made. From the 
moment we entered Béxar, the enemy was 
asked to surrender at discretion to which the 
enemy never consented. Let them deny this 
fact if they dare; let them deny the fact that a 
red flag was raised on the steeple of the 
cathedral of that city as a sign that no quarter 
would be granted and that everything would 
be carried by fire and sword. 54  
Like Castañeda, many other Mexican soldiers were angered by Santa 
Anna's twisting the truth of what occurred in order to justify the losses that the 
Mexican army suffered at the Alamo. Many felt that by altering the number who 
were killed, Santa Anna disgraced the honor of the men who died in the battle 
merely to be able to further his own cause. The morale of the army as a whole 
was effected by the results of the battle of the Alamo. The losses suffered there 
affected the soldiers so much that: 
The morale of the army had changed 
completely since the taking of the Alamo, 
because of the errors committed in that 
undertaking and the sufferings they were 
undergoing and had undergone en route; on 
the march the soldier could count only on half 
his rations and the officer had only enough to 
pay to provide himself with food, which was 
sold at prices quoted in gold by the very 
people who were responsible for providing 
these necessities. 55  
Most of the soldiers were of the same opinion that the amount of blood shed 
at the Alamo on both the sides of the Texans and the Mexicans was useless 
and unnecessary, yet it appeared as though the losses meant nothing to Santa 
Anna so long as the ends justified the means. General Vincente Filisola, Santa 
Anna's second in command was one of the soldiers who felt this way, and 
expressed this in his account of what occurred during the Texan campaign that 
was published in 1849. 
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In our opinion all that bloodshed of our 
soldiers as well as of our enemies was 
useless, having as its only objective an 
inconsiderate, childish, and culpable vanity 
so that it might be proclaimed that Béxar had 
been reconquered by force of arms and that 
in the attack many men had died on both 
sides. 56  
It was as a result of the losses the troops suffered that many of the men 
under Santa Anna's command began to develop contempt for him and began to 
view what happened at the Alamo as an event which was a disgrace that had 
tarnished the name of the Mexican nation.  
How much more glorious would have been 
the good name of Mexico if instead of so 
much blood and so many dead, the lives of 
the unbridled and ungrateful enemies of the 
Alamo…had been saved and the men sent to 
Mexico to engage in public works that would 
have in some degree indemnified the 
expenses that they had caused! And how 
great would not have been the fame of the 
same general in chief when without the loss 
of a single soldier and without any remorse 
whatsoever for the blood spilled later in San 
Jacinto, if he had brought back to his country 
that vast territory that the ungrateful protégés 
were trying to usurp. 57  
To many of his troops it seemed as though Santa Anna's reasoning for 
going ahead with the attack on the Alamo, even when he knew what the 
outcome might be for his soldiers, was to further his fame and glory. He 
showed no regard for the loss of so many lives and it was not until he saw 
firsthand the devastation among his ranks that he thanked his troops on behalf 
of their country and gave them praise. Yet even after seeing the losses his 
troops suffered, Santa Anna still failed to see the Alamo as a loss for Mexico. 
One of the biggest issues which Santa Anna's men disagreed with him on 
was the way in which he falsified the numbers in his reports back to Mexico 
about the outcome of the siege. In the letter that he wrote to the Secretary of 
War and Navy, General Jose Maria Torne on March 6, Santa Anna stated 
Among the corpses are those of Bowie and 
Travis, who styled themselves Colonels, and 
also that of Crockett, and several leading 
men, who had entered the Fortress with 
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dispatches from their Convention. We lost 
about 70 men killed and 300 wounded, 
among whom 25 are officers. 58  
The issue that this statement raises is the question of what were Santa 
Anna's motives for falsifying the numbers of troops that were killed and 
wounded in battle. Not only did Santa Anna change the numbers of the losses 
of his own troops, he also falsified the number of Texans that were killed as 
well. In the report sent back to Mexico, Santa Anna claimed that over 600 
Texans were killed in the battle. Like de la Peña in his account of what 
happened, Carlos Castañeda would also set the record straight about the 
number of Texans who were killed. 
In the report made on that date to the 
supreme government by His Excellency it is 
stated that more than 600 of the enemy were 
killed. I myself wrote that report and must 
now confess that I put down that number at 
the command of His Excellency. In stating 
the truth now, I must say that only 183 men 
were killed. I call upon the whole army to 
witness my statement. 59  
One reason for Santa Anna's falsifying the number of the Texans killed is 
that it would serve as a justification for the amount of lives that the Mexican 
army lost. Also, by altering the numbers of deaths the way he did, he also 
provided himself with a justification for why he handled the battle the way in 
which he did. He was also able to make it seem as though the troops who died 
did not die in vain, as was the commonly held sentiment of the surviving men 
who were part of the Texan Campaign. 
The feelings of loss experienced by the Mexican troops are an important 
factor in the story of the Battle of the Alamo. It was this feeling of loss that 
brought down the morale of the troops and led to their viewing the battle, and 
eventually the entire Texas campaign as a disgrace for both the military and for 
Mexico. Many of the soldiers came to blame Santa Anna for this loss, claiming 
that had he been willing to listen to what his officers had to say and considered 
alternative strategies, the outcome of the battle would have been much 
different. Many of the troops, like de la Peña, place blame on Santa Anna 
because he was aware of how unprepared the Mexican camp was for this 
battle, and the troops felt that because he had this knowledge, Santa Anna 
should not have given the order for the attack on the Alamo. 
To Santa Anna, the losses suffered did not matter, for him the only thing 
that was important was victory, and he was willing to do whatever it took to 
obtain the victory he desired. 
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The Mexican rank and file, said de la Peña, 
saw the battle of the Alamo as a ‘defeat' 
because of the many men who died for the 
vanity of a commander who cared nothing for 
their lives. 60  
Santa Anna was a very controversial political figure. He ruled as a caudillo 61 
and the way in which he conducted the Texas campaign is a reflection of this. 
The most obvious example of this being Santa Anna's refusing to listen to the 
suggestions which his senior officers offered him throughout the campaign. To 
some, the way in which he conducted the campaign itself was enough evidence 
to show how unnecessary it was.  
Santa Anna's careless delay in dispatching 
his troops after the battle to engage Sam 
Houston's army, thought de la Peña, proved 
how needless the premature assault on the 
Alamo had been. 62  
It was not until Santa Anna had received news of the victories of General 
Urrea along the Texan coastal plain that Santa Anna had decided to have his 
troops that remained in San Antonio pursue the remaining Texan rebels. Even 
so, the troops which he finally sent were sent off with inadequate rations, which 
to some showed signs of incompetence among high ranking officials. 63 The fact 
that Santa Anna waited so long to dispatch troops in pursuit of Sam Houston's 
army raises the question of what was the purpose of the attack on the Alamo if 
there were no intentions of immediately pursuing any remaining rebels after the 
battle was over. By doing so that would have certainly assured Santa Anna a 
victory in his Texas campaign, something which he desperately wanted, yet he 
waited until hearing word of the status of General Urrea and his troops before 
deciding to move on from San Antonio. Santa Anna's waiting to hear of the 
status of General Urrea's troops leads one to think that his motives in attacking 
the Alamo had nothing to do with trying to suppress the Texan rebels, but that 
his motives were selfish in nature.  
For Santa Anna, the battle of the Alamo was driven much by revenge. In 
December of 1835, General Cos had been defeated at the Alamo by the Texan 
rebels. This defeat resulted in a large loss of life for the Mexican troops, and 
like the battle of the Alamo that would occur only several months later, was 
viewed as a disgrace for Mexico. This loss was a driving force for Santa Anna's 
decision to attack the Alamo in March of 1836. Another motive for Santa Anna's 
decision to attack the Alamo was that it would further his fame and glory. This 
motive for the attack gives insight into the narcissistic nature of Santa Anna's 
personality. For Santa Anna, all that was important was the victory, not the 
means by which it was obtained or what ill effects came as a result. The 
narcissistic nature of Santa Anna's personality also gives insight into why he 
was so resistant to listen to the suggestions of his senior officers. In his mind, 
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Santa Anna felt that his way was the best and only way in which the 
Mexican army could succeed in the campaign against Texas. Examples of this 
can be seen in the way Santa Anna reacted when officers did not agree with his 
decision to spare no one but the women and when officers objected to the 
order of execution for Davy Crockett. It would be Santa Anna's narcissistic 
personality that would act as a contributing factor to his being not only unable, 
but also unwilling to see the Battle of the Alamo as his soldiers did, a loss. 
Even though Santa Anna's troops saw the Battle of the Alamo as a loss, 
and the reasons for this were apparent at the time, Santa Anna still viewed the 
battle as a victory, because for him to see the battle as a loss was not an option 
which he would consider. Even when the battle had ended and he saw how his 
troops had suffered and the losses that they incurred, his response was to 
thank them for their service to their country and to praise them for their 
courage, not to acknowledge the losses suffered and consider how these 
losses affected his men. It was imperative to Santa Anna that the battle was a 
victory because many people were questioning his tactics and his methods of 
leadership in Mexico. It was the way in which he ruled that would eventually be 
responsible for his being exiled three different times. In order to compensate 
and make the battle to appear as a victory, Santa Anna took several steps. 
These steps included Santa Anna ordering Carlos Castañeda to alter the 
numbers of Texans and Mexicans who were wounded and killed in the report 
about the battle that was sent back to Mexico. By increasing the number of 
Texans who were killed and by decreasing the number of Mexican wounded 
and dead, Santa Anna laid the groundwork for the battle and the entire 
campaign in Texas to be considered a worthwhile and successful effort. This 
effort however would be unsuccessful due to the loss at San Jacinto. It was the 
loss at San Jacinto that cost the Mexican army the Texas campaign, and had 
the Battle of the Alamo been conducted differently, it was a loss that could have 
been avoided.  
Santa Anna ignored many of the issues that his soldiers did not at the end 
of the battle. Santa Anna was well aware of how his soldiers felt about the 
results of the battle and was also well aware to the fact that his troops felt that 
the Alamo was not a victory for them, yet Santa Anna still saw the battle as a 
victory, often glorifying the sacrifice his fallen soldiers had made by saying how 
they gave their life for their country in his correspondence back to Mexico. To 
his troops however, this would not make up for the fact that their brothers-in-
arms died needlessly. The way in which Santa Anna handled the Battle of the 
Alamo demonstrates several of his characteristic military strengths and 
weaknesses: “he was able to pull an army together quickly and with severely 
limited resources, but he also combined elaborate planning with slipshod and 
faulty execution.” 64  
It is perhaps because of the slipshod and faulty execution of his plans that 
Santa Anna felt compelled to portray the Battle of the Alamo as a victory when 
his own troops considered it a loss.  
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The Battle of the Alamo is no doubt an important part of history, and as Sam 
Houston said, we should “Remember the Alamo”. The important thing however 
is that it is remembered correctly. If we are to remember it as it has been told to 
us, as a mythologized part of history shrouded in mystery, then what is the 
point of remembering it at all? The way in which the Alamo should be 
remembered is not as a tragedy for the Texans and a victory for the Mexicans. 
It should be and needs to be remembered for what it really was, Pyrrhic victory. 
Neither side won this battle. Both suffered terrible losses, and for the Mexicans 
it was ultimately what led to their downfall at the battle which would follow 
several weeks later at San Jacinto. 
It is only by looking at the experiences of the Mexican soldiers that we can 
truly begin to grasp what the true story of the Alamo was. While some aspects 
of the story may forever be clouded by myth and legend, others, by examining 
the Mexican side of the battle, become clearer with this knowledge. While we 
may never learn the entire truth surrounding Davy Crockett's death or whether 
or not William Barret Travis actually drew the line in the sand, we can see that 
Santa Anna was immensely under prepared for this campaign and we can learn 
how his men who at the outset of the Texas campaign revered him and were 
willing to follow him wherever he went, at the conclusion of the Battle of the 
Alamo hated and despised him. Not only are we made aware of these issues 
by taking a look at the Mexican side of the Alamo, but we become conscious of 
the driving forces which brought about these issues and the effect these issues 
had not just on the Mexican troops, but the entire Texas campaign. 
While the Battle of the Alamo has come to be symbolic of American freedom 
and liberty, it was a pointless battle, fought only to boost the ego of a 
narcissistic leader who craved fame and glory. The battle served no purpose to 
Santa Anna. It had no significance to Mexico militarily or politically, and as such 
was useless and unnecessary. In the end, the battle served only to cause death 
and destruction, as well hinder the morale of the Mexican troops. Although 
Santa Anna wanted his revenge for Cos' defeat only two months earlier, he 
failed to see that the costs of the battle would come to outweigh the results. 
Santa Anna lost almost 600 men at the battle, many of which resulted from his 
careless oversight to guarantee that there would be field surgeons and 
hospitals present within the Mexican camp to ensure that those who were 
wounded would receive the medical attention that they needed. These men, 
who died so needlessly, were only pawns to Santa Anna. To him they were 
merely things which he could command; he failed to see them for what they 
were. He failed to see his men as people with families and lives back in Mexico, 
that because of his decision to attack, they would never see again. 
It is by looking at the first-hand accounts of Santa Anna's troops that the full 
scope of the Mexican side of the Battle of the Alamo can be seen. By looking at 
the diary of José Enrique de la Peña, the journal written by Carlos Castañeda, 
the writings of General Vincente Filisola, as well as the correspondence back to 
Mexico and the military orders that Santa Anna himself wrote throughout the 
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campaign, that we can see how the Mexican troops truly felt about the 
Battle of the Alamo. The fact of the matter is that while at the onset of the 
Texas campaign, many if not all of Santa Anna's men felt it was an honor for 
them to be able to serve their country and that their cause was just, by the end 
of the Battle of the Alamo, many of his men, came to feel as though the battle 
was an embarrassment and disgrace to Mexico. Many of Santa Anna's men 
also came to feel that by altering the numbers of the Mexicans who were lost in 
the battle, he not only did them an injustice, but disgraced the honor of their 
fallen brothers-in-arms. 
The Battle of the Alamo, like many other things in history, can offer a 
valuable lesson. Not every battle results in a victory for someone and a loss for 
someone else. There are times, when for both sides, no matter what the 
outcome of the battle may be, there is no victory. Such was the case of the 
Battle of the Alamo. To the Texans, the loss was clear. For the Mexicans 
however, while the loss was clear to his soldiers, for Santa Anna himself, 
blinded by his quest for glory and revenge, the losses were never seen. This on 
its own was enough to affect the way in which the Mexicans would fight the rest 
of the Texan campaign. While the Texans learned from their loss, and were 
able to use it as their battle cry at San Jacinto, Santa Anna did not learn, or was 
unwilling to see the true outcome of the Alamo, and as a result, his troops 
never fully recovered from their loss and fell at San Jacinto. 
Although we will never be able to know the entire truth of the events 
surrounding the Battle of the Alamo, we can expand upon what is already 
known. The experiences of the Mexican troops not only serve to enrich our 
understanding of the Alamo battle but to shed light on issues surrounding the 
battle which have not been previously addressed by historians. It is only by 
viewing the battle as a Pyrrhic victory that we can be able to see how Santa 
Anna's men felt about the battle. Santa Anna's opportunities for a much 
different outcome than what really occurred abounded up until he put his plan 
of attack into effect. His men were aware of this, including the fact that General 
Ramírez y Sesma failed to take the Alamo at a time when there were only ten 
men present. Santa Anna's men were willing to do as their commander-in-chief 
ordered, but had hoped to do so with a minimal loss of life, especially since 
they were aware of the weakened status of the Alamo due to its lack of 
supplies. It was not until that Santa Anna ordered that no one would be spared 
except the women that the troops realized that any hope they had of the battle 
ending with as little blood shed as possible was gone.  
Many perspectives exist about the Battle of the Alamo. This, like the many 
other accounts that have been written by authors such as Stephen Hardin, 
James Crisp, and Paul D. Lack, offers a new insight into the events of the 
battle. However, it is up to the individual to take into consideration all of the 
different perspectives which have been presented throughout history in order to 
truly gain a more complete knowledge of the story of the Battle of the Alamo.  
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Mexicans, there are the facts. Judge for 
yourselves, and let your terrible verdict fall 
upon those who may deserve it. That to 
which I have been an eyewitness I have 
narrated faithfully, and that which I have not 
witnessed I have verified through the most 
circumspect and trustworthy men. If my 
sentiments do not please, my frankness will 
testify to the fact that at least I am honest, for 
I say what I feel and judge without prejudice 
and without fear of the hatred of those in 
power. 65  
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